Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization

Michele Lombardi and Naoki Yoshihara ()

No 662, Discussion Paper Series from Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University

Abstract: A partially-honest individual is a person who follows the maxim, "Do not lie if you do not have to" to serve your material interest. By assuming that the mechanism designer knows that there is at least one partially-honest individual in a society of n ≥ 3 individuals, a social choice rule (SCR) that can be Nash implemented is termed partially-honestly Nash implementable. The paper offers a complete characterization of the n-person SCRs that are partially-honestly Nash implementable. It establishes a condition which is both necessary and sufficient for the partially-honest Nash implementation. If all individuals are partially-honest, then all SCRs that satisfy the property of unanimity are partially-honestly Nash implementable. The partially-honest Nash implementation of SCRs is examined in a variety of environments.

Keywords: Nash implementation; pure strategy Nash equilibrium; partial-honesty; Condition μ* (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 57 pages
Date: 2017-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
https://hermes-ir.lib.hit-u.ac.jp/hermes/ir/re/28763/DP662.pdf

Related works:
Journal Article: Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization (2020)
Working Paper: Partially-Honest Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization (2018)
Working Paper: Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization (2018)
Working Paper: Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization (2017)
Working Paper: Partially Honest Nash Implementation:A Full Characterization (2013)
Working Paper: Partially Honest Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization (2013)
Working Paper: Partially Honest Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hit:hituec:662

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