On Initial Conferment of Individual Rights

Kotaro Suzumura, 興太郎 鈴村, コウタロウ スズムラ, Naoki Yoshihara (), 直毅 吉原 and ナオキ ヨシハラ

No a502, Discussion Paper Series from Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University

Abstract: An extended social choice framework is proposed for the analysis of initial conferment of individual rights. It captures the intuitive conception of decisionmaking procedure as a carrier of intrinsic value along with the instrumental usefulness thereof in realizing valuable culmination outcomes. Our model of social decision-making consists of two stages. In the first stage, the society decides on the game form rights-system to be promulgated. In the second stage, the promulgated game form rights-system, coupled with the revealed profile of individual preference orderings over the set of culmination outcomes, determines a fully-fledged game, the play of which determines a culmination outcome at the Nash equilibrium. A set of sufficient conditions for the existence of a democratic social choice procedure, which chooses a game form in the first stage that is not only liberal, efficient and Nash solvable, but also uniformly workable for every revealed profile of individual preference orderings over the set of culmination outcomes, is identified.

Keywords: Extended alternative; Extended constitution function; Uniformly rational choice; Liberal game form; Non-consequentialist evaluation of rightssystem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 41 pages
Date: 2008-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-hpe
Note: This version May 2008
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Related works:
Working Paper: On Initial Conferment of Individual Rights (2006)
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