On the General Existence of Pure Strategy Political Competition Equilibrium in Multi-dimensional Party-Faction Models

Naoki Yoshihara (), 直毅 吉原 and ナオキ ヨシハラ

No a511, Discussion Paper Series from Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University

Abstract: In this paper, we consider political competition games of two parties in multi-dimensional policy spaces, where the two parties have two factions, opportunists and militants, that intra-party bargain with each other. In such a game, we adopt the party-unanimity Nash equilibrium (PUNE) [Roemer (1998; 1999; 2001)] as an appropriate solution concept, and examine the general existence problem of this. In particular, we suppose that any faction of each party does not necessarily have dictatorial power. We then provide a general existence theorem for PUNE in this class of games.

Keywords: multi-dimensional political competition games; partyunanimity Nash equilibria; pure-compromise PUNE (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 C72 D72 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
Date: 2008-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth and nep-pol
Note: First: January 2007; This version: October 2008
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hit:hituec:a511

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