Rationality and the Nash Solution to Non-convex Bargaining Problems
Yongsheng Xu,
Naoki Yoshihara (nyoshihara@econs.umass.edu),
直毅 吉原 and
ナオキ ヨシハラ
No a537, Discussion Paper Series from Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University
Abstract:
Conditions α and β are two well-known rationality conditions in the theory of rational choice. This paper examines the implication of weaker versions of these two rationality conditions in the context of solutions to non-convex bargaining problems. It is shown that, together with the standard axioms of efficiency, anonymity and scale invariance, they characterize the Nash solution. This result makes a further connection between solutions to non-convex bargaining problems and rationalizability of choice functions in the theory of rational choice.
JEL-codes: C71 C78 D63 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 8 pages
Date: 2010-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-upt
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