EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

How to Deal with Covert Child Labour, and Give Children an Effective Education, in a Poor Developing Country: An Optimal Taxation Problem with Moral Hazard

Alessandro Cigno

No 474, PIE/CIS Discussion Paper from Center for Intergenerational Studies, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University

Abstract: As the return to education (and possibly also parental income) is uncertain, and given that the work a child does covertly for his own parents, and transfers between parents and children, are private information, the government should make school enrollment compulsory, set a legal limit (decreasing in parental income) on overt child labour, and redistribute across families using a flat-rate education grant, and a tax on parental income. That done, it should use a scholarship increasing in school results, and a tax on the skill premium, to raise the expected return to educational investment, and make it less uncertain.

Keywords: child labour; education; uncertainty; moral hazard (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 H21 H31 I28 J24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 16 pages
Date: 2010-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-dev and nep-lab
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
https://hermes-ir.lib.hit-u.ac.jp/hermes/ir/re/18493/pie_dp474.pdf

Related works:
Working Paper: How to Deal with Covert Child Labour, and Give Children an Effective Education, in a Poor Developing Country: An Optimal Taxation Problem with Moral Hazard (2010) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hit:piecis:474

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in PIE/CIS Discussion Paper from Center for Intergenerational Studies, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Digital Resources Section, Hitotsubashi University Library ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-19
Handle: RePEc:hit:piecis:474