How is disaster aid allocated within poor villages?

Yoshito Takasaki

No 25, PRIMCED Discussion Paper Series from Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University

Abstract: How disaster aid is allocated within poor villages is little understood. This paper examines risk-sharing institutions and social hierarchies as village self-allocation mechanisms. Original survey data from Fiji contain rich information about cyclone damage, traditional kin status, and aid allocations over post-disaster phases, at both household and kin-group levels. The paper shows under what conditions the performance of targeting aid to victims can significantly differ from overall risk-sharing outcomes determined by private transfers and aid (i.e., targeting gap). Elite domination in aid allocation can occur not only for given damage, but also in targeting on damage (i.e., targeting bias).

Keywords: disaster aid; informal risk sharing; social hierarchy; targeting; Fiji (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I38 O17 Q18 Q54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pages
Date: 2012-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dev
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https://hermes-ir.lib.hit-u.ac.jp/hermes/ir/re/22935/No25-dp.pdf

Related works:
Working Paper: How is disaster aid allocated within poor villages? (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hit:primdp:25

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