Decentralized Targeting of Agricultural Credit Programs: Private versus Political Intermediaries

Pushkar Maitra (), Sandip Mitra (), Dilip Mookherjee and Sujata Visaria ()
Additional contact information
Pushkar Maitra: Department of Economics, Monash University, Clayton Campus, VIC 3800, Australia.
Sandip Mitra: Sampling and Official Statistics Unit, Indian Statistical Institute, 203 B.T. Road, Kolkata 700108, India.
Sujata Visaria: Department of Economics, Lee Shau Kee Business Building, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Clear Water Bay, Hong Kong.
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Sujata Visaria and Sujata Visaria

No 2020-70, HKUST IEMS Working Paper Series from HKUST Institute for Emerging Market Studies

Abstract: We compare two different methods of appointing a local commission agent as an intermediary for a credit program. In the Trader-Agent Intermediated Lending Scheme (TRAIL), the agent was a randomly selected established private trader, while in the Gram Panchayat-Agent Intermediated-Lending Scheme (GRAIL), he was randomly chosen from nominations by the elected village council. More TRAIL loans were taken up, but repayment rates were similar, and TRAIL loans had larger average impacts on borrowers’ farm incomes. The majority of this difference in impacts is due to differences in treatment effects conditional on farmer productivity, rather than differences in borrower selection patterns. The findings can be explained by a model where TRAIL agents increased their middleman profits by helping more able treated borrowers reduce their unit costs and increase output. In contrast, for political reasons GRAIL agents monitored the less able treated borrowers and reduced their default risk.

Keywords: Targeting; Intermediation; Decentralization; Community Driven Development; Agricultural Credit; Networks. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H42 I38 O13 O16 O17 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 69 pages
Date: 2020-01, Revised 2020-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dev and nep-mfd
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Decentralized Targeting of Agricultural Credit Programs: Private Versus Political Intermediaries (2024)
Working Paper: Decentralized Targeting of Agricultural Credit Programs: Private versus Political Intermediaries (2021)
Working Paper: Decentralized Targeting of Agricultural Credit Programs: Private versus Political Intermediaries (2021)
Working Paper: Decentralized Targeting of Agricultural Credit Programs: Private versus Political Intermediaries (2020)
Working Paper: Decentralized Targeting of Agricultural Credit Programs: Private versus Political Intermediaries (2020)
Working Paper: Decentralized Targeting of Agricultural Credit Programs: Private versus Political Intermediaries (2020)
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