Behaviour in a Two-Stage Public Goods Experiment

Massimo Finocchiaro Castro

No 05/05, Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics from Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London

Abstract: In a two-stage public goods experiment, we study the effect that subjects’ possibility of contributing to a public good in the first stage of the game has on the voluntary contributions to the second public good. Our results show that subjects do not follow either the Nash strategy or the Pareto efficient strategy and that they perceive the two public goods as substitutes.

Keywords: public goods; experiments; voluntary provision. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A13 C92 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 15 pages
Date: 2005-05, Revised 2005-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
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