The Response of Ontario Primary Care Physicians to Pay-for-Performance Incentives

Jeremiah Hurley, Phil DeCicca (), Jinhu Li and Gioia Buckley
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Phil DeCicca: Department of Economics, Centre for Health Economics and Policy Analysis, McMaster University
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Philip DeCicca

No 2011-02, Centre for Health Economics and Policy Analysis Working Paper Series from Centre for Health Economics and Policy Analysis (CHEPA), McMaster University, Hamilton, Canada

Abstract: Beginning in 1999, Ontario introduced pay-for-performance incentives for selected preventive primary care services and defined sets of other services provided by family physicians, with the goal of improving the quality of patient care. These performance incentives were considerably expanded in 2004. At the request of the Ministry and as part of the collaborative research program between the Ontario Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care (MOHLTC) and the Centre for Health Economics and Policy Analysis (CHEPA), CHEPA researchers undertook an evaluation of the effect of performance incentives on service provision in Ontario. This report presents the results of that evaluation.

Date: 2011
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hea and nep-hrm
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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