Strategy-Proofness Versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match

Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Parag Abishek Pathak and Alvin Roth

Scholarly Articles from Harvard University Department of Economics

Abstract: The design of the New York City (NYC) high school match involved trade-offs among efficiency, stability, and strategy-proofness that raise new theoretical questions. We analyze a model with indifferences -- ties -- in school preferences. Simulations with field data and the theory favor breaking indifferences the same way at every school -- single tiebreaking -- in a student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism. Any inefficiency associated with a realized tiebreaking cannot be removed without harming student incentives. Finally, we empirically document the extent of potential efficiency loss associated with strategy-proofness and stability, and direct attention to some open questions. (JEL C78, D82, I21)

Date: 2009
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Published in American Economic Review

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Journal Article: Strategy-Proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match (2009)
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