Can Negotiating a Uniform Carbon Price Help to Internalize the Global Warming Externality?

Martin Weitzman

Scholarly Articles from Harvard University Department of Economics

Abstract: It is difficult to resolve the global warming free-rider externality problem by negotiating n different quantity targets. By contrast, negotiating a single internationally binding minimum carbon price (the proceeds from which are domestically retained) counters self-interest by incentivizing agents to internalize the externality. The model of this article indicates an exact sense in which each agent’s extra cost from a higher emissions price is counterbalanced by that agent’s extra benefit from inducing all other agents to simultaneously lower their emissions in response to the higher price. Some implications are discussed. While the study is centered on a formal model, the tone of the policy discussion resembles more an exploratory think piece.

Date: 2014
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene, nep-env and nep-res
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (101)

Published in Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists

Downloads: (external link)
http://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/1299232 ... ng.jaereversion2.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Can Negotiating a Uniform Carbon Price Help to Internalize the Global Warming Externality? (2014)
Working Paper: Can Negotiating a Uniform Carbon Price Help to Internalize the Global Warming Externality? (2013)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hrv:faseco:12992321

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Scholarly Articles from Harvard University Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Office for Scholarly Communication ().