Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium

Drew Fudenberg and Yuichiro Kamada

Scholarly Articles from Harvard University Department of Economics

Abstract: Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium (RPCE) describes the steady-state outcomes of rational learning in extensive-form games when rationality is common knowledge and players observe a partition of the terminal nodes. RPCE allows players to make inferences about unobserved play by others. We discuss the implications of this using numerous examples, and discuss the relationship of RPCE to other solution concepts in the literature.

Date: 2015
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (19)

Published in Theoretical Economics

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