Sequential Internet Auctions with Different Ending Rules

Toshihiro Tsuchihashi

Global COE Hi-Stat Discussion Paper Series from Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University

Abstract: Two ending rules, a soft close and a hard close, exist in Internet auctions. In hard close auctions, each auction ends with a fixed deadline determined by a seller. In soft close auctions, the end time automatically extends if at least one bid is submitted in the last few minutes, so each buyer has an opportunity to reply to other buyers' bids. The reserve prices set by the seller in hard close auctions are higher than the reserve prices in soft close auctions. The result is consistent with data of DS Lite auctions in Yahoo! Japan.

Date: 2009-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-ict
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