Patent Pools and Cross-Licensing in the Shadow of Patent Litigation

Jay Choi

Global COE Hi-Stat Discussion Paper Series from Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University

Abstract: This paper develops a framework to analyze the incentives to form a patent pool or engage in cross-licensing arrangements in the presence of uncertainty about the validity and coverage of patents that makes disputes inevitable. It analyzes the private incentives to litigate and compares them with the social incentives. It shows that pooling arrangements can have the effect of sheltering invalid patents from challenges. This result has an antitrust implication that patent pools should not be permitted until after patentees have challenged the validity of each other fs patents if litigation costs are not too large.

Date: 2009-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ind, nep-ino, nep-ipr and nep-pr~
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http://gcoe.ier.hit-u.ac.jp/research/discussion/2008/pdf/gd08-044.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: PATENT POOLS AND CROSS-LICENSING IN THE SHADOW OF PATENT LITIGATION (2010)
Working Paper: Patent Pools and Cross-Licensing in the Shadow of Patent Litigation (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hst:ghsdps:gd08-044

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