Partnership-Enhancement and Stability in Matching Problems

Koichi Tadenuma

Global COE Hi-Stat Discussion Paper Series from Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University

Abstract: In two-sided matching problems, we consider "natural" changes in prefer- ences of agents in which only the rankings of current partners are enhanced. We introduce two desirable properties of matching rules under such rank- enhancements of partners. One property requires that an agent who be- comes higher ranked by the original partner should not be punished. We show that this property cannot always be met if the matchings are required to be stable. However, if only one agent changes his preferences, the above requirement is compatible with stability, and moreover, envy-minimization in stable matchings can also be attained. The other property is a solidarity property, requiring that all of the "irrelevant" agents, whose preferences as well as whose original partners' preferences are unchanged, should be affected in the same way; either all weakly better off or all worse off. We show that when matchings are required to be stable, this property does not always hold.

Keywords: two-sided matching problem; stable matching; partnership; solidarity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 D63 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Related works:
Journal Article: Partnership-enhancement and stability in matching problems (2013)
Working Paper: Partnership-Enhancement and Stability in Matching Problems (2010)
Working Paper: Partnership-Enhancement and Stability in Matching Problems (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hst:ghsdps:gd10-137

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