On the Realizability of Social Preferences in Three-Party Parliamentary

Kazuya Kikuchi

Global COE Hi-Stat Discussion Paper Series from Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University

Abstract: It is widely held that compared with a legislature with a single majority party, a multi-party legislature achieves more precise representation of society. But the scope of such an advantage that a multi-party system has is rarely discussed. We study the range of social preferences that a three-party system can realize through majority voting. We present a procedure to construct a three-party system that will induce the policy choice specified by a given social preference relation. We provide a sufficient condition for a social preference relation to be compatible with some three-party system. The condition describes a certain restriction on the structure of cycles of social preferences.

Date: 2013-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic and nep-pol
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hst:ghsdps:gd12-290

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