The Positive Core of a Cooperative Game

Gooni Orshan () and Peter Sudholter ()

Discussion Paper Series from The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem

Abstract: The positive core is a nonempty extension of the core of transferable utility games. If the core is nonempty, then it coincides with the core. It shares many properties with the core. Six well-known axioms which are employed in some axiomatizations of the core, the prenucleolus, or the positive prekernel, and one new intuitive axiom, characterize the positive core on any infinite universe of players. This new axiom requires that the solution of a game, whenever it is nonempty, contains an element which is invariant under any symmetry of the game.

Pages: 26 pages
Date: 2001-08
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published in International Journal of Game Theory 39 (2010), 113 – 36

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