Encouraging a Coalition Formation

Michael Maschler

Discussion Paper Series from The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem

Abstract: A 4-person quota game is analyzed and discussed, in which players find it beneficial to pay others, in order to encourage favorable coalition structure.

Keywords: game theory; cooperative games; power of a coalition; coalition formations; experiments in game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 11 pages
Date: 2004
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-soc
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