Tight Correlated Equilibrium

Noa Nitzan ()

Discussion Paper Series from The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem

Abstract: A correlated equilibrium of a strategic form n-person game is called tight if all the incentive constraints are satisfied as equalities. The game is called tight if all of its correlated equilibria are tight. This work shows that the set of tight games has positive measure.

Pages: 10 pages
Date: 2005-06
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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