Evolutionary Dynamics for Large Populations in Games with Multiple Backward Induction Equilibria

Tomer Wexler

Discussion Paper Series from The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem

Abstract: This work follows “Evolutionary dynamics and backward induction” (Hart [2000]) in the study of dynamic models consisting of selection and mutation, when the mutation rate is low and the populations are large. Under the assumption that there is a single backward induction (or subgame perfect) equilibrium of a perfect information game, Hart [2000] proved that this point is the only stable state. In this work, we examine the case where there are multiple backward induction equilibria.

Pages: 20 pages
Date: 2005-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-gth and nep-mic
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