Towards a Characterization of Rational Expectations

Itai Arieli ()

Discussion Paper Series from The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem

Abstract: R. J. Aumann and J. H. Drèze (2008) define a rational expectation of a player i in a game G as the expected payo of some type of i in some belief system for G in which common knowledge of rationality and common priors obtain. Our goal is to characterize the set of rational expectations in terms of the game's payoff matrix. We provide such a characterization for a specific class of strategic games, called semi-elementary, which includes Myerson's "elementary" games.

Pages: 18 pages
Date: 2008-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-gth and nep-upt
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