A Discounted Stochastic Game with No Stationary Nash Equilibrium

Yehuda Levy

Discussion Paper Series from The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem

Abstract: We present an example of a discounted stochastic game with a continuum of states, finitely many players and actions, and deterministic transitions, that possesses no measurable stationary equilibria, or even stationary approximate equilibria. The example is robust to perturbations of the payoffs, the transitions, and the discount factor, and hence gives a strong nonexistence result for stationary equilibria. The example is a game of perfect information, and hence it also does not possess stationary extensive-form correlated equilibrium. Markovian equilibria are also shown not to exist in appropriate perturbations of our example.

Keywords: Stochastic Game; Discounting; Stationary Equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 2012-01-11, Revised 2012-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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