Best-Reply Dynamics in Large Anonymous Games

Yakov Babichenko

Discussion Paper Series from The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem

Abstract: We consider small-influence anonymous games with a large number of players $n$ where every player has two actions. For this class of games we present a best-reply dynamic with the following two properties. First, the dynamic reaches Nash approximate equilibria fast (in at most $cn\ log n$ steps for some constant $c>0$). Second, Nash approximate equilibria are played by the dynamic with a limit frequency of at least $1-e^{-c'n}$ for some constant $c'>0$.

Pages: 33 pages
Date: 2012-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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