A Cantor Set of Games with No Shift-Homogeneous Equilibrium Selection

Yehuda Levy

Discussion Paper Series from The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem

Abstract: We construct a continuum of games on a countable set of players that does not possess a measurable equilibrium selection that satisfies a natural homogeneity property. The explicit nature of the construction yields counterexamples to the existence of equilibria in models with overlapping generations and in games with a continuum of players.

Pages: 17 pages
Date: 2012-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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