A Discounted Stochastic Game with No Stationary Equilibria: The Case of Absolutely Continuous Transitions

Yehuda Levy

Discussion Paper Series from The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem

Abstract: We present a discounted stochastic game with a continuum of states, finitely many players and actions, such that although all transitions are absolutely continuous w.r.t. a fixed measure, it possesses no stationary equilibria. This absolute continuity condition has been assumed in many equilibrium existence results, and the game presented here complements a recent example of ours of a game with no stationary equilibria but which possess deterministic transitions. We also show that if one allows for compact action spaces, even games with state-independent transitions need not possess stationary equilibria.

Pages: 21 pages
Date: 2012-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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