A Game with No Bayesian Approximate Equilibria

Ziv Hellman ()

Discussion Paper Series from The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem

Abstract: Simon (2003) presented an example of a 3-player Bayesian games with no Bayesian equilibria but it has been an open question whether or not there are games with no approximate Bayesian equilibria. We present an example of a Bayesian game with two players, two actions and a continuum of states that possesses no approximate Bayesian equilibria, thus resolving the question. As a side benefit we also have for the first time an an example of a 2-player Bayesian game with no Bayesian equilibria and an example of a strategic-form game with no approximate Nash equilibria. The construction makes use of techniques developed in an example by Y. Levy of a discounted stochastic game with no stationary equilibria.

Pages: 12 pages
Date: 2012-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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