Markets, Correlation, and Regret-Matching

Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell

Discussion Paper Series from The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem

Abstract: Inspired by the existing work on correlated equilibria and regret-based dynamics in games, we carry out a first exploration of the links between the leading equilibrium concept for (exchange) economies, Walrasian equilibrium, and the dynamics, specifically regret-matching dynamics, of trading games that fit the economic structure and have the property that their pure Nash equilibria implement the Walrasian outcomes. Interestingly, in the case of quasilinear utilities (or "transferable utility"), all the concepts essentially coincide, and we get simple deterministic dynamics converging to Walrasian outcomes. Connections to sunspot equilibria are also studied.

Date: 2013-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-hpe, nep-mic and nep-upt
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Related works:
Journal Article: Markets, correlation, and regret-matching (2015)
Working Paper: Markets, Correlation, and Regret-Matching (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:huj:dispap:dp648

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