Consistent Voting Systems Revisited: Computation and Axiomatic Characterization

Bezalel Peleg

Discussion Paper Series from The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem

Abstract: We add two results to the theory of consistent voting. Let M be the set of all survivors of some feasible elimination procedure. We prove that i) M can be computed in polynomial time for each profile of preferences and ii) M is characterized by anonymity, non- imposition, Maskin monotonicity, and additive blocking.

Pages: 7 pages
Date: 2013-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
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