Determinacy of Games with Stochastic Eventual Perfect Monitoring

Itai Arieliy and Yehuda Levy

Discussion Paper Series from The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem

Abstract: We consider an infinite two-player stochastic zero-sum game with a Borel winning set, in which the opponent's actions are monitored via stochastic private signals. We introduce two conditions of the signalling structure: Stochastic Eventual Perfect Monitoring (SEPM) and Weak Stochastic Eventual Perfect Monitoring (WSEPM). When signals are deterministic these two conditions coincide and by a recent result due to [Shmaya (2011)] entail determinacy of the game. We generalize [Shmaya (2011)]'s result and show that in the stochastic learning environment SEPM implies determinacy while WSEPM does not.

Pages: 27 pages
Date: 2014-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-hpe
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Journal Article: Determinacy of games with Stochastic Eventual Perfect Monitoring (2015)
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