Representations of Political Power Structures by Strategically Stable Game Forms: A Survey
Bezalel Peleg and
Ron Holzman
Discussion Paper Series from The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem
Abstract:
We survey the results on representations of committees and constitutions by game forms that possess some kind of equilibrium strategies for each profile of preferences of the players. The survey is restricted to discrete models, that is, we deal with finitely many players and alternatives. No prior knowledge of social choice is assumed: As far as definitions are concerned, the paper is self-contained. Section 2 supplies the necessary general tools for the rest of the paper. Each definition is followed by a simple (but nontrivial) example. In Section 3 we give a complete account of representations of committees (proper and monotonic simple games), by exactly and strongly consistent social choice functions. We start with Peleg's representations of weak games, and then provide a complete and detailed account of Holzman's solution of the representation problem for simple games without veto players. In Section 4 we deal with representations of constitutions by game forms. Following Gärdenfors we model a constitution by a monotonic and super additive effectivity function. We fully characterize the representations for three kinds of equilibrium: Nash equilibrium; acceptable equilibrium (Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium); and strong Nash equilibrium. We conclude in Section 5 with a report on two recent works on representations of constitutions under incomplete information.
Pages: 26 pages
Date: 2018-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-mic
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Journal Article: Representations of Political Power Structures by Strategically Stable Game Forms: A Survey (2017) 
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