The labor market effects of trade unions - Layard meets Melitz

Jochen Michaelis () and Marco de Pinto ()
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Marco de Pinto: Institute for Labour Law and Industrial Relations in the EU, University of Trier

No 201406, IAAEU Discussion Papers from Institute of Labour Law and Industrial Relations in the European Union (IAAEU)

Abstract: Trade unions are typically able to convert their industrial power into political power. We show that, depending on the parameter constellation, stronger trade unions may be welfare-improving in terms of an increase in aggregate employment and output, if they successfully lobby for lower trade barriers set by the government.

Keywords: Trade unions; lobbying; trade liberalization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F13 F16 J51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-int and nep-pol
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http://www.iaaeg.de/images/DiscussionPaper/2014_06.pdf First version, 2014 (application/pdf)

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Working Paper: The labor market effects of trade unions Layard meets Melitz (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iaa:dpaper:201406

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