Tax Evasion by Individuals
Laszlo Goerke
No 201409, IAAEU Discussion Papers from Institute of Labour Law and Industrial Relations in the European Union (IAAEU)
Abstract:
The basic deterrence model of tax evasion is described, its main predictions are derived and limitations and flexibility are outlined. Further, the model is interpreted in light of some key institutional features characterising tax enforcement in OECD countries. Throughout the survey, findings originating from the deterrence model are contrasted with predictions which result from a simple model of criminal activity and law enforcement.
Keywords: Economics of Crime; Income Tax; Tax Evasion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H24 H26 K34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ger, nep-iue, nep-law and nep-pbe
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iaa:dpaper:201409
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