Imperfect Quality Information in a Quality-Competitive Hospital Market

Hugh Gravelle and Peter Sivey

Melbourne Institute Working Paper Series from Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, The University of Melbourne

Abstract: We examine the implications of policies to improve information about the qualities of profit seeking duopoly hospitals which face the same regulated price and compete on quality. We show that if the hospital costs of quality are similar then better information increases the quality of both hospitals. However if the costs are sufficiently different improved information will reduce the quality of both hospitals.

Pages: 30 pages
Date: 2009-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-hea
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Working Paper: Imperfect quality information in a quality-competitive hospital market
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