Do Financial Incentives Influence GPs’ Decisions to Do After-Hours Work? A Discrete Choice Labour Supply Model

Barbara Broadway (), Guyonne Kalb, Jinhu Li and Anthony Scott ()
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Barbara Broadway: Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, The University of Melbourne; and ARC Centre of Excellence for Children and Families Over the Life Course, http://melbourneinstitute.com/staff/bhanel/

Melbourne Institute Working Paper Series from Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, The University of Melbourne

Abstract: This paper analyses doctors’ supply of after-hours care, and how it is affected by personal and family circumstances as well as the earnings structure. We use detailed survey data from a large sample of Australian General Practitioners to estimate a structural, discrete-choice model of labour supply and after-hours care. This allows us to jointly model how many daytime-weekday hours a doctor works, and his or her probability of providing after-hours care. The underlying utility function varies across individual and family characteristics. We simulate labour supply responses to an increase in doctors’ hourly earnings, both in a daytime-weekday setting and for after-hours care. Among doctors overall, men and women increase their daytime-weekday working hours if their hourly earnings in this setting increases, but only to a very small extent. Men’s labour supply elasticities do not change if their family circumstances change, but for women the small behavioural response disappears completely if they have preschool-aged children. Doctors are somewhat more likely to provide after-hours care if their hourly earnings in that setting increases, but again the effect is very small and is only evident in some sub-groups. Moreover, higher earnings in weekday-daytime practice reduces the probability of providing after-hours care, particularly for men. Increasing doctors’ earnings appears to be at best relatively ineffective in encouraging increased provision of after-hours care, and may even prove harmful if incentives are not well-targeted.

Keywords: Labour supply; after-hours care; wage elasticity; health workforce; MABEL (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I11 J21 J22 J44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 34pp
Date: 2016-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dcm, nep-lma and nep-upt
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http://melbourneinstitute.unimelb.edu.au/downloads ... series/wp2016n12.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Do Financial Incentives Influence GPs' Decisions to Do After‐hours Work? A Discrete Choice Labour Supply Model (2017)
Working Paper: Do Financial Incentives Influence GPs' Decisions to Do After-Hours Work? A Discrete Choice Labour Supply Model (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iae:iaewps:wp2016n12

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