 SAME POWER BUT DIFFERENT GOALS: HOW DOES KNOWLEDGE OF OPPONENTS’ POWER AFFECT NEGOTIATORS' ASPIRATION IN POWERASYMMETRIC NEGOTIATIONS?Ricky S. Wong Global Journal of Business Research, 2014, vol. 8, issue 3, 77-89 Abstract: This article focuses on dyadic negotiations in which negotiators have asymmetric best alternatives to the negotiated agreement (BATNAs). We argue it is important to consider negotiator’s knowledge states of opponent’s BATNAs. The experimental study also examined how negotiator’s perceptions of opponent’s BATNAs were formed and how knowledge given to different negotiators affected negotiator aspiration levels. The findings show that Negotiator estimates of opponent BATNAs are affected by their own BATNAs even when the range of possible BATNAs is given; strong negotiator’s knowledge of opponent’s BATNAs increases their aspiration levels; and weak negotiator’s knowledge reduces their aspiration levels. How knowledge of BATNA-asymmetries affects aspiration depends on which party has access to it. Keywords: Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA); Negotiation; Power Asymmetry; Knowledge; Aspiration (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ibf:gjbres:v:8:y:2014:i:3:p:77-89 Access Statistics for this article Global Journal of Business Research is currently edited by Terrance Jalbert More articles in Global Journal of Business Research from The Institute for Business and Finance Research |
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