When populists deliver on their promises: the electoral effects of a large cash transfer program in Poland

Michał Brzeziński, Jan Gromadzki and Katarzyna Sałach
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Katarzyna Sałach-Dróżdż and Michał Brzeziński

No 02/2022, IBS Working Papers from Instytut Badan Strukturalnych

Abstract: We estimate the effects of the introduction of a large cash transfer program on support for the ruling populist party in Poland. We exploit the variation at the municipal level in the annual cash transfer amount received per capita, and use a difference-in-differences research design to study the electoral effects of the transfer. Our results show that a cash transfer amount of $100 per capita translated into an increase in the vote share for the ruling party of nearly two percentage points. We also find that these effects were largely due to the recruitment of previously non-voting individuals. We conclude that without the transfer program, all else being equal, the populist party would not have remained in power.

Keywords: Elections; Voting Behavior; Populism; Unconditional Cash Transfer (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H23 H53 I38 J18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 82 pages
Date: 2022-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-eur, nep-pol and nep-tra
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Journal Article: When populists deliver on their promises: the electoral effects of a large cash transfer programme in Poland (2024)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ibt:wpaper:wp022022

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