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The Organization of Bank Affiliates; A Theoretical Perspective on Risk and Efficiency

Elisa Luciano and Clas Wihlborg

ICER Working Papers from ICER - International Centre for Economic Research

Abstract: We analyze theoretically banks choice of organization and leverage in branches or subsidiaries in the presence of organizational and financial synergies, government bailouts, bankruptcy costs and varying correlations between risk-factors. The social efficiency of banks’ choices are analyzed as well taking into account operational synergies and distortions caused by banks’ exploitation of benefits of limited liability if there is a probability of governments bail-out. Leverage choice can be viewed as a trade-off between expected benefits of limited liability and bankruptcy costs. The choice of subsidiary vs branch organization can be viewed as a trade-off between organizational synergies and bankruptcy costs and this tradeoff depends on other factors mentioned. The theoretical and numerical analysis has a number of policy implications. We emphasize the role of capital requirements, explicit and implicit protection of banks’ creditors, restrictions on organizational choice with different synergies, insolvency procedures for banks affecting private and social costs associated with a bank’s insolvency

Keywords: bank subsidiaries; bank branches (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G21 G32 G33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 42 pages
Date: 2013-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-lam, nep-ltv and nep-neu
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:icr:wpicer:06-2013

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