Aggregate litigation and regulatory innovation: another view of judicial efficiency

Giovanni Ramello (giovannibattista.ramello@unito.it)

ICER Working Papers from ICER - International Centre for Economic Research

Abstract: In this article, we argue that aggregate litigation and the court system can not only restore the protection of victims and the production of deterrence, but also play a pivotal role in stimulating regulatory innovation. This is accomplished through a reward system that seems largely to mimic the institutional devices used in other domains, such as intellectual property rights, by defining a proper set of incentives. Precisely the described solution relies on creating a specific economic framework able to foster economies of scale and grant a valuable property right over a specific litigation to an entrepreneurial individual, who in exchange provides the venture capital needed for the legal action, and produces inputs and focal points for amending regulations. In this light, aggregate litigation thus can be equally seen as an incubator for regulation.

Keywords: aggregate litigation; efficiency; market for risk; hierarchy; regulation; innovation; asbestos (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G32 K41 L23 O31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 2011-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ino, nep-law and nep-reg
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Downloads: (external link)
http://www.bemservizi.unito.it/repec/icr/wp2011/ICERwp24-11.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Aggregate litigation and regulatory innovation: Another view of judicial efficiency (2012)
Working Paper: Aggregate Litigation and Regulatory Innovation: Another View of Judicial Efficiency (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:icr:wpicer:24-2011

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