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Tacit Collusion in the Santiago Housing Market

Fernando Lefort and Miguel Vargas ()

No 4735, Research Department Publications from Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department

Abstract: Given the numerous and widely acknowledged benefits of a well-functioning housing market, it is vital to understand the degree of competition in that market, which is the starting point for undertaking any policy tool aimed at improving its efficiency. This paper tests the extent of competition in the housing market in Santiago, Chile using a two-step methodology. In the first step, using a hedonic price model, the Santiago housing market is divided into sub-markets, which are analyzed separately. The second step is the tacit collusion test itself, which compares the industry markup with the business cycle in each sub-market using panel data regression models. Evidence of collusion is found in certain sub-markets.

JEL-codes: O54 R21 R23 R28 R31 R38 R58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ure
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Working Paper: Tacit Collusion in the Santiago Housing Market (2011) Downloads
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