Deregulation

Rohan Pitchford

International and Development Economics Working Papers from International and Development Economics

Abstract: It is well known in the theoretical literature on deregulation, that any informative signal will be used to give the firm appropriate incentives. This paper presents a model of deregulation that draws on the multi-task model of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991). Sufficient conditions are derived for deregulation to be optimal despite the existence of a signal that contains information about the firm’s activity. The conditions ensure that there is an adverse response by the firm whenever the regulator tries to use the signal for incentives.

JEL-codes: D23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 2001
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ind and nep-reg
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:idc:wpaper:idec01-9

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