Public Procurement and Rent-Seeking: The Case of Paraguay

Emmanuelle Auriol, Thomas Flochel () and Stephane Straub

No 661, IDEI Working Papers from Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse

Abstract: A model of entrepreneurial choices in an economy with a corrupt public procurement sector is built, providing predictions along two main dimensions. First, corruption is more frequent in sectors where public institutions are large buyers. Second, firms favoured with corrupt contracts enjoy extra returns, so that procurement related activities attract the best entrepreneurs. A large scale microeconomic database, including all public procurement operations over a 4 year period in Paraguay, amounting annually to approximately 6% of the country’s GDP, is then used to corroborate these predictions.

Keywords: Procurement; Corruption; Rent-seeking; Development (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D73 H57 O5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ent and nep-lam
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Public Procurement and Rent-Seeking: The Case of Paraguay (2016)
Working Paper: Public Procurement and Rent-Seeking: The Case of Paraguay (2015)
Working Paper: Public Procurement and Rent-Seeking: The Case of Paraguay (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ide:wpaper:24172

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