Inventories and Endogenous Stackelberg Leadership in Two-period Cournot Oligopoly

Sebastien Mitraille and Michel Moreaux

No 730, IDEI Working Papers from Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse

Abstract: Two-period Cournot competition between n identical firms producing at constant marginal cost and able to store before selling has pure strategy Nash-perfect equilibria, in which some firms store to exert endogenously a leadership over rivals. The number of firms storing balances market share gains, obtained by accumulating early the output, with losses in margin resulting from increased sales and higher operation costs. This number and the industry inventories are non monotonic in n. Concentration (HHI) and aggregate sales increase due to the strategic use of inventories.

JEL-codes: D43 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-com and nep-ind
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Related works:
Journal Article: Inventories and Endogenous Stackelberg Leadership in Two‐Period Cournot Oligopoly (2013)
Working Paper: Inventories and Endogenous Stackelberg Leadership in Two-period Cournot Oligopoly (2012)
Working Paper: Inventories and Endogenous Stackelberg Leadership in Two-period Cournot Oligopoly (2012)
Working Paper: Inventories and Endogenous Stackelberg Leadership in Two-period Cournot Oligopoly (2011)
Working Paper: Inventories and Endogenous Stackelberg Leadership in Two-period Cournot Oligopoly (2011)
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