Bargaining in River Basin Committees: Rules Versus Discretion

Michel Le Breton, Alban Thomas and Vera Zaporozhets ()

No 732, IDEI Working Papers from Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse

Abstract: In this paper, we introduce a game-theoretical non-cooperative model of bargaining to analyse project funding in the French river basin com- mittees. After sorting out some of the main theoretical predictions, we proceed with an empirical application to the subsidy policy of French Wa- ter Agencies. The theoretical model of bargaining is simulated for various risk preferences, and a reduced-form estimation of the distribution of sub- sidies is performed. We find some evidence in support of the predictions regarding the role of bargaining in decision-making for water management.

JEL-codes: D10 D64 D91 E21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-ppm
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Working Paper: Bargaining in River Basin Committees: Rules Versus Discretion (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ide:wpaper:26054

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