Inference on Vertical Contracts between Manufacturers and Retailers Allowing for Non Linear Pricing and Resale Price Maintenance

Céline Bonnet and Pierre Dubois

No 519, IDEI Working Papers from Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse

JEL-codes: C12 C33 L13 L81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-04, Revised 2008-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-mic and nep-mkt
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Inference on vertical contracts between manufacturers and retailers allowing for nonlinear pricing and resale price maintenance (2010)
Working Paper: Inference on Vertical Contracts between Manufacturers and Retailers Allowing for Nonlinear Pricing and Resale Price Maintenance (2009)
Working Paper: Inference on Vertical Contracts between Manufacturers and Retailers Allowing for Nonlinear Pricing and Resale Price Maintenance (2009)
Working Paper: Inference on Vertical Contracts between Manufacturers and Retailers Allowing for Non Linear Pricing and Resale Price Maintenanc (2008)
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