Coordination of random yield supply chains with improved revenue sharing contracts

Jiarong Luo and Xu Chen

European Journal of Industrial Engineering, 2016, vol. 10, issue 1, 81-102

Abstract: This article examines the role of revenue sharing contracts in the coordination of supply chains with random yield and stochastic market demand. With game theory models, we derive the retailer's optimal order policy and the supplier's optimal production policy under revenue sharing contracts. We find that the traditional revenue sharing contract is no longer able to coordinate the supply chain in the context of random yield and stochastic demand. Nonetheless, when combined with a surplus subsidy mechanism (improved revenue sharing contracts), it can coordinate the supply chain and simultaneously allow the supply chain profit to be divided between the two firms arbitrarily by choosing proper contract parameters. Finally, we illustrate the results via numerical examples. [Received 2 August 2014; Revised 1 December 2014; Revised 14 February 2015; Accepted 3 May 2015]

Keywords: supply chain management; SCM; random yield supply chains; stochastic demand; supply chain coordination; revenue sharing contracts; game theory; optimal order policy; optimal production policy; surplus subsidy. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.inderscience.com/link.php?id=75105 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ids:eujine:v:10:y:2016:i:1:p:81-102

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in European Journal of Industrial Engineering from Inderscience Enterprises Ltd
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sarah Parker ().