Does ownership structure matter in explaining derivatives' use policy in French listed firms

Sabri Boubaker, Salma Mefteh and Junaid M. Shaikh

International Journal of Managerial and Financial Accounting, 2010, vol. 2, issue 2, 196-212

Abstract: The purpose of this study is to investigate the effect of ownership structure on derivatives' use policy. Using data for 262 French non-financial listed firms, the results show that the two decisions of whether to use derivatives or not and the extent of derivatives use are not affected by the same variables. CEO ownership has a negative effect on the decision to use derivatives, whereas CEO tenure length influences negatively the extent of derivative use. CEO age impacts positively both decisions, whereas firms that grant stock options to their CEOs do not rely too much on derivatives. However, the presence of outside blockholders seems not to affect the firms' hedging policy.

Keywords: derivatives; derivative use; corporate governance; CEO ownership; France; ownership structure; French listed firms; CEO tenure length; CEO age; stock options; hedging policy. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Working Paper: Does ownership structure matter in explaining derivatives’ use policy in French listed firms (2010)
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