Economic incongruities in the European patent system

Malwina Mejer and Bruno van Pottelsberghe de la Potter ()

No 2009/31, Working Papers from Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB)

Abstract: This article argues that the consequences of the ‘fragmentation’ of the European patent system are more dramatic than the mere prohibitive costs of maintaining a patent in force in many jurisdictions. The prevalence of national jurisdictions, which are highly heterogeneous in their costs and practices, over the validity and enforcement of European patents induces both a high level of uncertainty and an intense managerial complexity which undoubtedly reduces both the effectiveness and the attractiveness of the European patent system in its mission to stimulate innovation.

Keywords: European patent system; litigation process; enforcement; uncertainty (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K41 O34 P14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
Date: 2009
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Economic incongruities in the European patent system (2012)
Working Paper: Economic incongruities in the European patent system (2009)
Working Paper: Economic incongruities in the European patent system (2009)
Working Paper: Economic Incongruities in the European Patent System (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ieb:wpaper:doc2009-31

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