Financing public education when altruistic agents have retirement concerns

Daniel Montolio, Amedeo Piolatto and Luca Salvadori
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Luca Salvadori: Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona & TARC & IEB

No 2022/01, Working Papers from Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB)

Abstract: We study, theoretically and empirically, the link between voters’ suport for public education and pensions when agents are free to choose between public and private education. We show that the (inter-generational) redistributive component in the retirement system creates a link between pensions and education. Specifically, the current investment in education increases future productivity and, hence, future tax proceeds. This channel applies for households that chose private education too. Consequently, the support for publicly financed education grows together with the generosity and degree of redistribution of the retirement system. The empirical analysis uses repeated cross-country surveys to confirm the model predictions.

Keywords: Public Education; Educational Choice; Pension System; Bismarckian Factor; Majority Voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D7 H31 H42 H44 H52 H55 I22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
Date: 2021
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-age and nep-pbe
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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https://ieb.ub.edu/ca/publication/2022-01-financin ... retirement-concerns/

Related works:
Working Paper: Financing public education when altruistic agents have retirement concerns (2011)
Working Paper: Financing public education when altruistic agents have retirement concerns (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ieb:wpaper:doc2022-01

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