Can Teachers Influence Student Perceptions and Preferences? Experimental Evidence from a Taxation Course

José Mª Durán-Cabré (), Alejandro Esteller-Moré (), Daniel Montolio and Javier Vázquez-Grenno ()
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José Mª Durán-Cabré: Universitat de Barcelona & IEB
Alejandro Esteller-Moré: Universitat de Barcelona & IEB
Javier Vázquez-Grenno: Universitat de Barcelona & IEB

No 2024/02, Working Papers from Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB)

Abstract: In a two-country model, the citizens of a ‘big home country’ can either fictitiously move residence to a ‘small foreign country’ where residence-based taxes are lower (external tax avoidance), or under-report the tax base at home (internal tax avoidance). Tax setting is the result of Cournot-Nash competition between revenue maximizing governments, with the home government also setting two types of administration policies, one for each form of tax avoidance. We show that although it is optimal to employ both types of administration policies, which in themselves are both effective at tackling the targeted form of tax avoidance, the optimum is characterized by a tradeoff in terms of policy outcomes: either internal avoidance increases and external avoidance decreases, or the opposite, depending on the characteristics of the fiscal environment.

Keywords: Tax perceptions/preferences; experimental design; student/teacher gender bias (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A23 H20 I2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 pages
Date: 2024
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-pub
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