Anti-Limit Pricing

Byoung Jun () and In-Uck Park

No 503, Discussion Paper Series from Institute of Economic Research, Korea University

Abstract: Extending Milgrom and Roberts (1982) we present an infinite horizon entry model, where the incumbent(s) may use the current price to signal its strength to deter entry. We show that, due to the importance of entrants' types on the post-entry duopoly/oligopoly pro?ts, the incumbent(s) may want to signal its weakness to invite entry of weaker firms

JEL-codes: D42 D43 D82 L11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://econ.korea.ac.kr/~ri/WorkingPapers/w0503.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Anti-Limit Pricing (2010)
Working Paper: Anti-Limit Pricing (2005)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iek:wpaper:0503

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Paper Series from Institute of Economic Research, Korea University Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Kim, Jisoo ().